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ABSTRACT 
With the industry trend of shifting from a traditional hierarchical 
approach to flatter management structure,  crowdsourced 
performance assessment gained mainstream popularity. One 
fundamental challenge of crowdsourced performance assessment is 
the risks that personal interest can introduce distortions of facts, 
especially when the system is used to determine merit pay or 
promotion. In this paper, we developed a method to identify bias 
and strategic behavior in crowdsourced performance assessment, 
using a rich dataset collected from a professional service firm in 
China. We find a pattern of “discriminatory generosity” on the part 
of peer evaluation, where raters downgrade their peer coworkers 
who have passed objective promotion requirements, while 
overrating their peer coworkers who have not yet passed. This 
introduces two types of biases: the first aimed against more 
competent competitors, and the other favoring less eligible peers 
which can serve as a mask of the first bias. This paper also aims to 
bring angles of fairness-aware data mining to talent and 
management computing. Historical decision records, such as 
performance ratings, often contain subjective judgment which is 
prone to bias and strategic behavior. For practitioners of predictive 
talent analytics, it is important to investigate potential bias and 
strategic behavior underlying historical decision records. 
KEYWORDS 
Performance Assessment; People Analytics; Fairness-aware Data 
Mining. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Performance assessment is a fundamental aspect of human 
resources management (HRM). Accurate and informative 
performance assessment is highly valuable, as it serves a wide 
range of core HRM tasks: implementing incentive compensations 
such as merit pay, making critical personnel decisions such as 
promotions, and designing plans for workplace learning and career 
development [1, 14, 19].  In the realm of predictive talent analytics, 
outputs from performance assessment (e.g., performance ratings) 
are commonly used as input variables to predict career progression, 
                                               ∗ An earlier version of this paper has been circulated under the title, Strategic 
Manipulation in Peer Performance Evaluation: Evidence from the Field. Available 
at SSRN: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2776229. 
turnover behaviors, job satisfaction, and other key outcomes [11, 
17, 23, 27]. 
Assessing performance is never purely objective. Some subjective 
judgement is almost always involved, especially in evaluating the 
performance of creative workers. Traditionally, performance 
assessment uses a “top-down” system in which supervisors assess 
their subordinates [16]. However, since information of a specific 
employee’s performance is dispersed among his/her supervisors, 
peers, subordinates, and even business partners, it is appealing to 
“crowdsource” performance assessment by asking all the relevant 
people to participate in performance assessment. 
This is the basic idea behind crowdsourced performance reviews, 
360-degree feedback, or multi-source assessment: employees’ 
compensation and promotion decisions are partially based on 
performance assessment by themselves and their coworkers [5, 6]. 
With the industry trend of shifting from a traditional hierarchical 
approach to flatter organizational structure,  crowdsourced 
performance assessment becomes more and more popular. It was 
reported that between one-third and one-half of U.S. companies use 
some form of crowdsourced performance assessment [22]. This is 
consistent with a separate estimation that over one-third of US 
companies and more than 90% of Fortune 500 firms use some form 
of 360-degree feedback [5, 10]. As an example, in Google, software 
engineers evaluate the performance of themselves and their co-
workers every six months, and these assessments play an important 
role in merit pay and promotion decisions.1 
While crowdsourcing performance assessment can have many 
advantages over traditional top-down approach, it also brings about 
new challenges, especially with regard to bias and strategic 
behavior. For instance, as noted by Jack Welch, former CEO of 
General Electric, “Like anything driven by peer input, the system 
is capable of being ‘gamed’ over the long haul” [25]. When the 
system is used to determine merit pay or promotion, raters likely 
face a conflict of interest problem in evaluating their colleagues, 
who are also potential competitors for promotions. Either wittingly 
or unwittingly, personal interest can introduce distortions of facts. 
To this end, in this paper, we collected comprehensive HR archival 
data consisting of employees attributes, crowdsourced performance 
1 Google’s practice has been documented in Quora, a question-and-answer website: 
https://www.quora.com/How-are-performance-reviews-done-at-Google-What-are-
they-used-for. 
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assessment, and promotion outcomes, from a mid-sized Chinese 
professional service firm. We developed a method to discover and 
measure bias and strategic behavior. To our knowledge, this is one 
of the first public studies of crowdsourced performance assessment 
utilizing field data from a company. 
The key of our approach is to leverage objective measure of 
qualification as a benchmark, to investigate how does the 
relationship between rater (i.e., the one who gives rating) and ratee 
(i.e., the one who receives rating) affect the rater’s recognition of 
the ratee’s qualification in assessment. We find that employees 
discriminate against “peers” (i.e., employees who are within the 
same hierarchical rank, and hence close competitors for 
promotions). Specifically, employees tend to denigrate qualified 
peers who have already passed objective requirements for 
promotion, while giving generous ratings to peers who have not yet 
passed. Employees recognize positive “qualification premium” to 
their nonpeer coworkers (i.e., giving higher rating to those qualified 
nonpeers than unqualified nonpeers), while recognizing negative 
“positive premium” to their peers. In addition, employees gave 
themselves favorable ratings so that on average an employee would 
improve her percentile rank by about 6.3% if the assessment result 
was dictated by her own ratings (to self and to coworkers in the 
team). 
This paper also aims to bring angles of fairness-aware data mining 
[12, 18] to talent and management computing [24, 26, 28], where 
we are working on data produced by people about people for 
making high-stakes decisions directly impacting people. Historical 
decision records, such as performance ratings or promotion 
decisions, often contain subjective judgement which is prone to 
bias and strategic behavior. For practitioners of predictive talent 
analytics, it is important to investigate potential bias and strategic 
behavior underlying key variables derived from historical decision 
records. 
2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data used in our study were retrieved from a Chinese 
professional service firm’s HR archive and performance 
assessment archive, covering a five-year period from 2010 to 2014. 
In the assessment, within each of the 7 engagement departments of 
the office, every employee is asked to evaluate everyone else within 
the department as well as to conduct self-evaluation. The 
maintenance of anonymity of each participant’s evaluations is 
instructed in the assessment process. 
Each observation in our dataset is a rating record, specifying the 
year of rating, the rater, the ratee, performance rating (averaged 
over the 30 dimensions), and information about the rater and ratee 
(e.g., department affiliation, rank at the time of performance 
evaluation, age, gender, educational background). We have a total 
of 7,778 rater-ratee-year observations for the five years comprising 
153 unique employees in 7 departments of the firm. A 0-to-10 
numeric scale of performance rating is used, where 0 indicates the 
poorest performance and 10 the best. 
According to the firm’s promotion guidelines, there are two 
requirements that an employee needs to meet in order to be 
qualified for promotion. First, the relative ranking of her 
performance assessment rating must be among the top 50% in the 
group of employees at the same level in her department. Second, 
for each level, there are some objective qualifications for 
promotion, including attendance, academic qualifications, project 
experience, and tenure. 
3 METHODS OF DETECTING STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR 
Our main empirical model is the following: 
Rijt = β0 + β1Peerijt + β2Qualjt + β3Peerijt × Qualjt 
+ FERateeRank + FERatee + FEDept + FEYear + εijt       (1) 
In the regression equation (1), Rijt denotes the rating that rater i 
gives to ratee j at year t. The rating scale ranges from 0 to 10 with 
0 denoting the poorest performance and 10 denoting the highest 
level of performance. We define the variable Peerijt equal to 1 if the 
rater i and ratee j are of the same rank in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
We define the variable Qualjt equal to 1 if the ratee j has already 
passed minimum requirements for promotion (in terms of 
attendance, academic qualifications, project experience, and 
tenure) at year t, and 0 otherwise. We control for fixed-effects 
specific to each ratee, ratee’s rank, ratee’s department, and 
evaluation year. 
Qualification Premium captures the idea that a ratee who passed 
objective promotion requirements (Qual=1) should get higher 
ratings compared to the counterfactual scenario where the ratee 
does not pass (Qual=0). We define qualification premium as a 
function of Peer: DQual(Peer) = R(PEER, 1) – R(Peer, 0). We can 
derive qualification premium conditional on whether rater is a peer:  
DQual(Peer) = "R(1,1)	-	R(1,0) =	β2+ β3         if Peer=1R(0,1)	-	R(0,0) = β2               	if Peer=0          (2) 
Peer Difference captures the difference in ratings that a ratee 
received from a peer rater (Peer=1) and that from a non-peer rater 
(Peer=0). We define peer difference as a function of Qual: 
DPeer(Qual) = R(1, Qual) – R(0, Qual). We can derive peer 
difference conditional on whether ratee is qualified: 
DPeer(Qual) = "R(1,1)	- R(0,1)  = β1+ β3         if Qual=1R(1,0)	- R(0,0) = β1               		if Qual=0          (3) 
How do we identify and measure strategic manipulation? Without 
manipulation, we expect peer raters and non-peer raters to behave 
similarly in recognizing qualification premiums. In other words, a 
rater’s measured qualification premium should not depend on 
whether the ratee is a peer or not. That is, ∆Qual(1) = ∆Qual(0), 
which implies that β3 = 0. We can also consider this from the 
perspective of peer difference. Without manipulation, we expect 
the peer difference to be independent of whether the peer ratee has 
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passed requirement or not. That is, ∆Peer(1) = ∆Peer(0), which 
also gives to β3 = 0. To sum up, the interaction terms in the 
regression model are important for quantifying strategic 
manipulation, and we expect β3 = 0, in the absence of strategic 
manipulation. 
4 RESULTS OF DETECTING STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR 
4.1  Preliminary Evidence of Strategic Behavior 
We start by providing some simple evidence showing that 
employees are indeed exhibiting self-interested manipulation in 
their rating behavior. We ask a simple question: how much do an 
employee’s own ratings (of herself and of others) lead to a better 
performance ranking in the department than what she actually 
achieves in the assessment? In other words, how would an 
employee’s assessment result be improved if the result was wholly 
dictated by her own ratings? To answer this question, we define a 
measure ∆PRself  = PRself - PRactual, where PRself is the employee’s 
percentile rank2  according to her own rating and PRactual is her 
percentile rank in the actual assessment result. Since higher 
percentile rank corresponds to better relative ranking, a positive 
∆PRself implies that the employee’s relative ranking according to 
her own ratings is better than what she actually achieves in the 
assessment. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of these three 
variables. 
TABLE 1 ANALYSIS OF SELF-ASSESSMENT 
Variables  # Obs. Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
∆PRself 432 0.065 0.171 -0.625 0.000 0.037 0.140 0.847 
PRself 432 0.573 0.300 0.000 0.338 0.611 0.833 1.000 
PRactual 432 0.508 0.311 0.000 0.243 0.500 0.778 1.000 
Notes: These summary statistics are computed over common observations. 
The results suggest that an employee’s percentile rank is 
substantially higher according to her own ratings, compared with 
the actual assessment result. On average an employee would 
improve her percentile rank by about 6.5% if the assessment 
result was dictated by her own ratings. Raters systematically rank 
themselves among the top half of employees in the department, thus 
placing themselves above the bar (which is at 50%) to satisfy the 
promotion requirement.  
4.2 Ratings from Head, Peers, Nonpeers and Self 
In the assessment process, each employee receives evaluations 
from his/her department head, peers, nonpeers and also conducts 
self-assessment. Do the average ratings of different components 
                                               
2 If there are n people and an employee is ranked as the k-th highest, then her 
percentile rank is (k-1)/(n-1). She gets a percentile rank of 1 if she obtains the highest 
rating, while a percentile rank of 0 corresponds to the poorest rating in the 
department. 
agree with each other? Table 1 presents the correlation matrix 
analysis. 
TABLE 2 CORRELATION MATRIX: AVERAGE RATINGS FROM DIFFERENT 
COMPONENTS 
Component All Head Peers Nonpeers Self 
All 1.000     
Head 0.834*** 1    
Peers 0.619*** 0.520*** 1   
Nonpeers 0.982*** 0.827*** 0.490*** 1  
Self 0.448*** 0.439*** 0.448*** 0.409*** 1 
Notes: *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Department head’s ratings are less correlated to ratings from 
peers than to ratings from nonpeers (0.520 vs. 0.827). Interpreting 
department heads’ ratings as a nonstrategic benchmark, this is 
consistent with our basic notion that peers are more likely to 
manipulate their ratings strategically than nonpeers. In addition, 
department heads’ ratings and the overall average ratings are highly 
correlated (0.834).  
Lastly, average ratings from nonpeers and the overall average 
ratings have a correlation coefficient as high as 0.982. This suggests 
that the peer evaluation part of the assessment only leads to a very 
limited degree of discrepancy between average nonpeer ratings and 
the overall ratings in our study.3 
4.3 Regression Analysis: Ratee Qualification, 
Peer Status, and Strategic Rating Behavior 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the OLS regression.  
Overall, the empirical results suggest that raters do reward non-peer 
rates for passing the objective promotion requirements (i.e., β2 > 0). 
However, the regression coefficient of the interaction term between 
Peer and Qual (i.e., β3) is significantly negative, suggesting that 
when the rater is a peer, she actually “punishes” the ratee who 
has passed promotion requirements (i.e., the total effect is 0.165 - 
0.493 < 0, p < 0.01). In other words, ceteris paribus, if the ratee 
passed promotion requirements, compared with the case of not 
passing, he/she would secure higher ratings from non-peer raters, 
and get lower ratings from peer raters. In addition, the coefficient 
on Peer (i.e., β1) is significantly positive, suggesting that raters 
give higher ratings to less qualified peers (i.e., DPeer(0) > 0). 
TABLE 3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS: RATEE QUALIFICATION, PEER STATUS, 
AND STRATEGIC RATING BEHAVIOR 
Dep. Var.: RATINGijt  OLS 
Peerijt β1 0.436*** 
  (0.061) 
Qualjt β2 0.165*** 
  (0.042) 
3 These results remain robust if we use within-department percentiles of average 
ratings instead of the raw value of average ratings. 
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Peerijt × Qualjt β3 -0.493*** 
  (0.079) 
Ratee rank fixed-effects  Yes 
Ratee fixed-effects  Yes 
Year fixed-effects  Yes 
Department fixed-effects  Yes 
N  7,346 
Adj. R2  0.393 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by ratee and year are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
In Figure 1 we illustrate the Qualification Premium and Peer 
Differences, using estimated coefficients from Table 3. We can 
clearly see the interaction effects between ratee qualification and 
peer status. Qualification premium is negative when the rater is a 
peer, while it is positive when the rater is a nonpeer. Peer difference 
is positive when the ratee failed qualification, while it becomes 
slightly negative when the ratee is qualified. 
 
Figure 1 Ratee Qualification Premium and Peer Difference 
These results indicate a “discriminatory generosity” on the part 
of peer raters, leading them to denigrate the relative ranking of peer 
ratees who have already passed promotion requirements, while 
overrating peer ratees who have not yet passed promotion criteria. 
This is consistent with our notion of strategic reporting, which 
simultaneously introduces two types of biases: the first aimed 
against more competent competitors, and the other favoring less 
eligible peers (possibly as a mask of the first bias). 
5 FURTHER ANALYSIS: EVALUATING THE 
IMPACT OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 
In this session, we further explore the relationship between 
performance assessment and promotion decisions. Specifically, we 
are interested in learning to which extent the strategic behavior in 
peer evaluation affect promotion outcomes. This counterfactual 
reasoning is very challenging; we consider our attempts here as an 
exploration to generate some insights rather than fully solving the 
problem. 
5.1 Ratings and Promotion Decisions 
The first step in answering this question is to estimate the effects of 
the performance ratings on employees’ promotion probabilities. To 
do this, we collected annual promotion outcomes from the firm’s 
personnel archive. Then we estimate empirical specifications to 
determine how much good performance ratings and passing 
objective promotion requirements affected an employee’s chances 
of being promoted within the firm. 
Table 4 presents estimation results of our logistic regression models 
using PROMOTIONjt as the dependent variable (coded 1 if a ratee 
gets promoted after the annual performance assessment, and 0 
otherwise). In these regressions, we use as a regressor PRjt, the 
within-department percentile of an employee’s average rating, 
rather than the raw rating. We do so for two reasons. First, the firm 
uses relative rankings to specify the minimum requirement for 
being considered for promotion. Second, the rating percentile 
provides a more comparable measure across years, since it is 
invariant to fluctuations of rating leniency over the five years of our 
sample. In addition, we include in the model LICENSEjt (coded 1 if 
the ratee j has obtained the license in year t, and 0 otherwise) to 
control for differences in professional qualifications across ratees. 
Finally, we include fixed effects for year, department, and (pre-
evaluation) rank. 
TABLE 4 LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PROMOTION DECISIONS 
Dep. Var.: PROMITIONjt Logit Logit 
PRjt 6.721*** 5.472*** 
 (1.235) (1.088) 
Qualjt 1.546*** 0.490 
 (0.555) (0.324) 
PRjt × Qualjt -2.572**  
 (1.070)  
Licensejt 1.373*** 1.282*** 
 (0.393) (0.391) 
Constant 3.408*** -2.850*** 
 (0.826) (0.784) 
Rank fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes 
Department fixed-effects Yes Yes 
N 426 426 
Pseudo R2 0.380 0.370 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
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In Table 4, Column 1 presents the specification which includes the 
percentile of rating (PRjt), ratee qualification (Qualjt) and the 
interaction term between them. The coefficients on PRjt and Qualjt 
are both positive and significant at 1%. The interaction term is 
negative and significant at 5%. Column 2 presents the specification 
without the interaction term. While the coefficient on Qual remains 
positive, the statistical significance weakened (p-value = 0.13).  
These results suggest, first, that passing the objective qualification 
contributes to promotion. Second, the negative coefficient on the 
interaction term indicates that the marginal importance of 
performance rating decreases as the employee passes promotion 
requirements. In other words, a good rating is more important for 
those who have not yet passed promotion qualifications. These 
results suggest substitutability between performance rating and 
passing promotion requirements. 
5.2 Counterfactual Simulation: Impact of 
Strategic Behavior on Promotion 
Logically, we expect strategic behavior in peer evaluation to distort 
the aggregated assessment results in a direction that benefits those 
who have not yet passed promotion requirements, who manipulated 
ratings to improve their relative ranking among their peers. 
Whether and to what extent the strategic manipulation biases 
assessment results and promotion outcomes is a question of 
significant practical implications. Here we conduct explorations to 
generate some insights using counterfactual simulation. 
There are four counterfactual scenarios to consider.  
1. CShead Assessment results are determined only by the 
department head’s ratings. This proxies for the rating that an 
employee would have received in a hypothetical top-down 
performance evaluation scenario. 
2. CSpeer Assessment results are determined only by the peer 
evaluation component.  
3. CSnonpeer Assessment results are determined only by the 
nonpeer component. All peer evaluations in the original 
assessment are dropped. This helps us to see to what extent the 
peer evaluation part distorts overall promotion outcomes.  
4. CSself Assessment results are determined only by self-
assessments. An employee’s percentile rank is determined by 
the relative ranking of her self-assessment compared with the 
ratings she gives to others. 
In each scenario, we will use the corresponding counterfactual 
assessment results to simulate the probability of promotion 
(denoted as PCS) for each employee, employing the fitted logistic 
model of promotion decision in the first column of Table 4. Then, 
we compare the counterfactual promotion probabilities with actual 
promotion probabilities (denoted as Pactual) which are the predicted 
promotion probabilities using the actual assessment results. We 
define ∆CS = PCS - Pactual as the increase of promotion probability in 
the counterfactual scenario compared with the actual case. For 
example, if an employee’s Pactual is 0.3 and Phead is 0.4, then her 
∆head is 0.1. That is, her probability of promotion would increase by 
0.1 if the promotion decision was solely determined by her 
department head’s rating. 
Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the counterfactual 
changes in promotion probabilities. The most notable result is that 
employees increased their promotion probabilities if the appraisal 
results were determined by their own ratings. In this scenario 
(CSself), 42.79% of employees increased their promotion 
probabilities while 31.84% of employees had decreased promotion 
probabilities. On average, an employee increased her promotion 
probability by 3.98 percentage points under CSself, which represents 
a relative increase of 7.16% (the average probability of actual 
promotion is 55.59% in this sample). This result characterizes the 
extent to which one’s self-assessment promotes self-interest. In 
fact, this result is driven by that self-assessment tends to inflate 
one’s own percentile rank as showed in Table 1. 
TABLE 5 SUMMARY STATISTICS: SIMULATED CHANGES IN PROMOTION 
PROBABILITY 
Variables  # Obs. Mean Median SD % negative 
%  
zero 
%  
positive 
∆head 426 0.0125 0 0.1060 38.97 28.64 32.39 
∆peer 368 0.0079 0 0.1566 37.50 24.18 38.32 
∆nonpeer 426 0.0003 0 0.0677 27.46 47.18 25.35 
∆self 402 0.0398 0 0.1398 31.84 25.37 42.79 
Table 6 presents the correlation matrix of these four simulated 
changes in promotion probabilities together with ratee 
qualification. First, ∆peer and ∆nonpeer have a significantly negative 
correlation coefficient of −0.283. This is the only pair of ∆CS 
variables that are negatively correlated, suggesting that these two 
counterfactual scenarios lead to different consequences upon 
promotion outcomes. This result is consistent with our expectation 
that peer evaluation and nonpeer evaluation reflect different 
motives in the rater. Second, ∆peer and Qual are negatively 
correlated (−0.103, and significant at 5%), which is consistent with 
our earlier finding that raters gave higher ratings to their 
unqualified peers while gave lower ratings to their qualified peers.  
TABLE 6 CORRELATION MATRIX: RATEE QUALIFICATION AND SIMULATED 
CHANGES IN PROMOTION PROBABILITY 
Variables Qual ∆head ∆peer ∆nonpeer ∆self 
Qual 1.000     
∆head 0.017 1    
∆peer -0.103** 0.126** 1   
∆nonpeer -0.061 0.178*** -0.283*** 1  
∆self 0.033 0.304*** 0.218*** 0.165*** 1 
5 RELATED WORK 
In this session, we review some related work in economics, 
management science, and accounting on performance assessment. 
Discovery of Bias and Strategic Behavior in Crowdsourced 
Performance Assessment TMC 2019, Alaska, USA 
 
 6 
This aims to facilitate interdisciplinary perspective which is 
particularly valuable for talent and management computing. 
Subjective performance evaluation and optimal incentive 
contract. In economics, there is a large body of theoretical literature 
on optimal incentive contracting with both objective measures and 
subjective evaluations [1, 19, 20]. Some recent studies also 
consider the role of crowdsourced performance evaluation [8, 9]. 
Tournament, peer performance evaluation, and sabotage. In 
economics and management science, researchers conducted 
laboratory experiments to simulate workplace environment. In a 
setting where peer performance assessment is used to determine the 
allocation of tournament prize, participants exert less effort when 
sabotage becomes more likely, recognizing that their performance 
would not be fairly recognized by their peers [7]. Tournament 
structures (or relative performance schemes in general) have the 
potential to incentivize higher effort, it also induces higher 
sabotage, which can reverse the incentive effects [2, 13]. 
Bias in traditional top-down performance assessment. Subjective 
performance evaluation has also been a long standing research 
topic in management accounting. However, the focus of the 
literature has been on the traditional top-down managerial appraisal 
of subordinates [3, 4, 15, 21]. [3] shows that both centrality bias 
(raters’ tendency to compress performance ratings) and leniency 
bias (tendency to inflate employees’ performance ratings) in 
performance evaluation are managers’ defensive mechanisms to 
alleviate ramifications of truthful ratings. And both centrality bias 
and leniency bias are positively affected by information gathering 
costs and strong employee-manager relationships, but they do not 
necessarily damage employee performance. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we investigated bias and strategic behavior in 
crowdsourced performance assessment, using a rich dataset 
collected from a professional service firm in China. We developed 
a method that analyzes how the relationship between rater and ratee 
affects the recognition of the ratee’s objective measure of 
qualification. We find that a pattern of “discriminatory generosity” 
on the part of peer raters, who denigrate the relative ranking of peer 
ratees who have already passed promotion requirements, while 
overrating peer ratees who have not yet passed promotion criteria. 
We also explored the impact of the bias and strategic behavior using 
counterfactual simulation based on the relationship between 
performance assessment and promotion outcomes. 
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